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Abortion - - . Part XI 
(A Legal Review Continued) 
Rt. Rev. Msgr. Paul V. Harrington, P.A., J.C.L. 
In the previous article, we 
investigated the rights of the unborn 
child in civil law to sue for pre-natal 
injuries and under the wrongful death 
statutes. We shall continue in this 
article the consideration of the fetus 
. and its status in the civil law. 
2. The ·Right of the Fetus to 
Receive Support 
Kindregan refers to State Statutes 
and two cases to demonstrate that the 
fetus has the right to receive support 
and that the state can vindicate and 
enforce it. f 
The Penal Code of California 
requires a father to support all minor 
children and an unborn child is 
included within this requirement.2 In 
1933, a California Court indicated that 
there was a crime involved in the 
non-support of an unborn child and 
the defendant could be so charged. 3 
A second California decision Kyne 
v. Kyne - in 1940 - ruled that a suit 
could be brought before the court on 
behalf of an unborn child in order to 
have paternity legally determined and 
in order to insure his proper support.4 
26~ 
An action was instituted juvenile 
Court in Colorado on be; ·If of an 
unborn child, claiming tha ~ ·he fetus 
was a dependent child undr the state 
statute concerned with su; ;ort. ·The 
Supreme Court of the Sta!, tssuedan 
order which rt1quired the d· ·- ndant to 
set aside thirty per cent o . £1is salary 
for the support of his un .. Jrn child. 
The deCision relates that "' .} violence 
is done to the orderly pn · :~ ss of the 
rational mind by letting the vord child 
include a human being l :; 'mediately 
upon conception."5 
3. The .Rights of a Fetus to Inherit 
Provided a fetus is s~:bsequently 
born alive, he has always er:j oyed from 
the common law the righ · to inherit. 
"The law of inheritance adopts the 
view that if one dies intestate, his 
unborn child, if born alive, inherits 
equally with its older brothers and 
sisters." 6 Atkinson states "An 
(Monsignor Har r in g ton iS 
Vice-Officialis for the A rchdiocese o/ 
Boston) 
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state's posthumous child is 
I)DSJi<leJred in being and will inherit 
. as if he had been born in the 
~:-1:estate's lifetime .... This was the 
_,mmon law rule with respect to both 
ealty !lnd personalty ... a 
posthumous child may recover his 
share of the father's land from a b~na 
fi~e · p~rchaser obtaining title through 
&Judicial partition sale." 7 
. A Massachusetts decision in 1834 
4eclared that a bequest to children or 
:IE anmacrulldt:en in existence at the time 
of a testator's death would include a 
posthumous child or grandchild who 
en ventre sa mere at that time. 8 
A will contested in New York in 
7 reached an identical conclusion 
ICC:Orttli'!n2 to the legal instrument, ~ 
fund was to be established from 
residue of the testatrix' estate and 
was to be ~ivided "in to as many 
al parts as I may have 
living at the time of my 
It was ascertained by the 
that a female grandchild had 
conceived three weeks before the 
of the testatrix and was 
' in ~eing, existing and havin~ 
~t the time of her demise. The 
. made finding that she "was 
18 a living child for . all purposes 
. to her property rights. " 9 
lS about as close to the moment 
con~eption· as one could hope to 
This further indicates that the law 
fetal life to be human and 
fetus as a person from the very 
of conception. 
law, thus, . recognizes the 
, the life, and the person of 
fetus and his right, during prenatal 
, to benefit from intestate 
' from a will or a trust and 
~ the exercise of this right after 
~etus has been born. 
4· The Rights ·of a Fetus under 
Workmen's CompensationAct 
A 1943 case in the United States 
reached exactly the same conclusion as 
a 1907 case before the English Courts 
( cf. supra, . Williams v. Ocean Coal Co., 
Lt~., footnote #6): the conclusion 
bemg that a child conceived before but 
born only after the father's death is to 
~e considered as in existence at the 
tl~e .of the demise and, thus; to be the 
recipient and beneficiary of any and 
all benefits, under Workmen's 
Compensation statutes, to which 
existing children are entitled. 1 o 
5· The Right of a Fetus to Sue 
before birth through a legally 
appointed Guardian 
. This capti.on includes two closely 
mterrelated nghts - the right to have a 
guardian legally appointed for a fetus 
and the right of the fetus to bring an 
act~?n .before the Courts, using the 
servic~s of the legally appointed 
guar~an -and, therefore, they will be 
considered together. 
In 1940, an expectant mother who 
was a minor, petitioned for' the 
appointment of a guardian ad litem for 
her yet unborn child. The guardian 
was appointed and she in turn 
brought an action, in advance of birth 
and ?n behalf of the fetus, before the 
California Courts for the 
determination of paternity and for the 
assurance of support. The defendant 
argued against the right of an unborn 
c~ld .to sue but the Court recognized 
this nght to sue when the litigation 
sought a determination of paternity 
and the enforcement of support. 1 1 
New Jersey had two cases in its 
courts in the 1960's - which referred 
to the appointment of guardians ancl 
to blood transfusions. 
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In 19 61 , guardianship over an 
unborn child was given to a county 
department of welfare to ensure that 
the child, when born , could and would 
receive blood transfusions , that were 
essential and necessary for his 
continued good health. 1 2 
The second case came before the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in 1964. In 
this particular case , the expectant 
mother, because of religious reasons · 
and objections of conscience , would 
not allow blood transfusions. The 
Court ordered the appointment of a 
special guardian for the protection of 
his health. 1 3 
In each of these cases, the courts 
clearly recognized that the fetus had 
rights - thus indicating that the fetus 
is a person - and that these rights 
could only pe safeguarded by the 
appointment of a guardian who, in the 
absence of the unborn child , would 
seek his welfare and best interests. 
6. The Right of a Fetus to Birth and 
to Life 
Under this caption, we shall 
consider what right a fetus possesses to 
be born and to live and what 
recognition the law and the courts 
have given to this right. 
The English common law , 
. acknowledging the right of a fetus to 
be born, would not allow the 
execution of a pregnant woman , who 
was charged and found guilty of a 
capital offense , which was punishable 
by death. 
In former times, the law required 
that the defendant be "quick with 
child" before it would stay the 
execution. The reason for insisting on 
the "quick" rule, was the fact that this 
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was the only real test of pre· nancy 
that medical science had devel, ?ed in 
that period. A devious, conspir 1g and 
intriguing woman could 1se a 
pregnancy as the reason or e;: :use to 
delay an execution and no or · could 
prove or disprove whether or tot she 
was pregnant. 
In specific ·instances, the English 
Courts would actually impar~- a jury 
of matrons, whose responsibiJ : y under 
their oath , was to exan ;1e the 
defendant and report bad- to the 
court whether the wor• Lll was 
pregnant by reason of havi, . ~ found 
her ·"quick" with child. 
As medical science prese', · ed valid 
tests of pregnancy that wou! . indicate 
the presence ot absence of s1. ::h a state 
long before "quickening" . the law 
abandoned the "quick" rule and now 
pregnancy in any stage is <: :·eason to 
seek and be granted -. stay of 
execution. Also, the imparl Jing of a 
jury of matrons has disap; : ared and 
the examination of a ·ompetent 
doctor will suffice. F j ~ . 1lly, the 
execution is not only sta) ··d but set 
aside completely and the d·.:fendant is 
sentenced to penal servitud.; for life.14 
Barry notes: "When tl. : plea was 
successful, the reprieve v-- as granted, 
not out of considerati•. ;n of the 
woman, but in favorem pro/is" (~ 
favor of the offspring).1 5 What this 
statement says is that the reprieve was 
not granted for a sentimental or 
emotional reason just because the 
woman was pregnant but it was given 
because the law recognize:> that .a fetu~ 
has the right to be born and to bve an 
execution of the mother would 
deprive the fetus of thi basic right. 
This was clearly set forth in a 1949 
decision in State v. Cooper. 1 6 
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might be interjected at this time 
· the original laws, declaring 
to be a crime, were passed 
because the State recognized 
right of a fetus to be born and to 
and realized that such a right is 
r.Utinl~ui:she:d by each abortion. 
The fact that a fetus has a right to 
born and thereby has a right t'o all 
tbe:raJX!Utic measures necessary to 
his prenatal health and his live 
and the fact that the law and the 
recognized these rights is 
ent in two very important 
;~:isi1ons with reference to blood 
In 1961, a case was presented to the 
Jersey Court The facts were 
: a woman was in the advanced 
of pregnancy , which was 
~Jpllc:ated by erythroblastosis fetalis 
blood incompatibility between 
and child. If the chil'd were to 
and to grow into a healthy 
~Dl Stl:!r and develop normally , he 
require transfusions of blood 
birth to replace the diseased 
he was carrying. In advance of 
the mother indicated that , 
of religious beliefs, she could 
authorize and she would not allow 
blood transfusions. 
petition was presented to the 
on behalf of the unborn child, 
indicating that his very life and 
was at stake unless the 
were allowed. The court 
these rights of the fetus to 
and good health and realized that 
State had a responsibility and 
to enforce these rights. 
decision in the Hoener v. 
case, the Court considered 
to be a minor child in the 
of the statute which allows 
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the court to take a child from the 
custody of parents, when his best 
interests are not being protected. In so 
ruling, the Court relied on its civil 
paternal jurisdiction, which imposes a 
responsibility ·on the government to 
protect the rights of its Citizens, 
particularly citizens who are not in a 
positio.n to care for themselves. 
The court entrusted the unborn 
child to a county welfare department 
and authorized this body to provide 
any and all care that the infant would 
require to sustain his life and to assure 
sound health. The decision clearly 
indicated that the "fetus was before 
the court." It need not be pointed out 
that only persons come ·before the 
courts. In passing, the court noted: "It 
is now settled that an unborn child's 
right to life and health is entitled to 
legal protection, even if it is not 
viable. "1 7 (emphasis supplied) 
The . second case was different in 
regard to the · facts and more 
complicated with reference to the legal 
· implications. It was decided by the 
Supreme Court . of New Jersey. The 
expectant mother was in the 
thirty-second week of her pregnancy 
and was a patient in the hospital. She 
required blood transfusions but would 
not give permission. Without the 
transfusions , the health and the life of 
the unborn child were in jeopardy. 
The hospital , wherein she was a 
patient , sought the permission of the 
court to administer blood against. the 
conscientious objections of the 
patient. The court faced a. serious 
dilemma: on the one hand, the court 
would wish to protect the life and 
health of the unborn child ~ on the 
other hand, the court would not wish 
to achieve this objective by compelling 
a mature adult to act involuntarily and 
particularly when this would ·involve a 
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violation of conscience. In the same 
year, 1964, Georgetown University 
Hospital had petitioned the courts for 
authorization to transfuse a 
non-pregnant adult against the wishes 
and the religious objections of the 
patient and the court refused to grant 
permtsswn even though it was 
demonstrated that transfusions of 
healthy blood were necessary to 
maintain life and hea1th. 1 8 
In considering. the· conflict of rights 
the right of the fetus to life and 
birth and the right of the adult for 
self-determination and for the 
respectful following of religious beliefs 
and principles of conscience - the 
court concluded that the right of the 
fetus to be born and to live was the 
more important and must prevail : 
"We are satisfied that the unborn child 
is entitled. to the law's protection and 
that the appropriate order should be made 
to insure blood transfusions in the event 
that they are needed. " 1 9 
This decision was appealed but 
review was denied. 2 0 
As mentioned previously (cf. supra), 
the Court also provided for the 
appointment of a legal guardian for 
the fetus , who was empowered to seek 
any and all therapeutic assistance to 
guarantee the safe delivery of the 
child. 
Because of the conflict of rights and 
particularly because of the 
determination of what right prevailed, 
this case , in a very special way, points 
up how basic and important is the 
right of a fetus to be born and how 
seriously the courts and the State 
recognize their responsibility to 
protect and safeguard this right. 
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In the light of this dec is· m, it 
would seem quite contradicto y and 
inconsistent for the State to li' ·!ralize 
its abortion laws or to ~galize 
abortion , whereby the right )f the 
fetus to be born would ot be 
recognized or protected . and \ hereby 
the very life of the fetus \\' uld be 
annihilated and extinguished. 
in . fact, it were found that 
pen sable injury · ·and damage 
The simultaneity of the injury 
conception was an innovation. 
In .a lengthy opi.nion , in which the 
rt discussed the social and 
I J iiCOlllOrnic implications of illegitimate 
and admitted that the injury was 
·•:~conti.111uous and irreparable", the 
7. The Right of the Fetu: Not to was denied because it was 
Be Born that, since this was an 
of the existing concept of 
injury, the legislature should 
lltc~rrnline if illegitimate birth was an 
Having just established the :;ht of a 
fetus to be born and the resp 1sibility 
of the State and the courts t protect 
this right , it seems contrad tory to 
talk in terms of a fetus' righ t ~t to be 
born. Two cases have rec ly been 
introduced with reference t 1e social 
condition of the fetus at .rth and 
have, at their very core, the 'Jligation 
of a child to be born illegil · :late and 
the right of a child to sue f ( damages 
because of an illegitimate st<:1- iS. 
A third case concerns the . · ligation 
of a child to be born \Vl , 1 serious 
physical defects. 
The first case was brov .1t before 
the courts of Illinois in 1:. · 3 . A son 
sued his father for damage-· by reason 
of having been born illegiti1 ate and as 
the result of an adulterous mion. The 
Court, in its decision, refe -·ed to this 
situation as the tort of "wrongful 
life". The injury to the cLdd did not 
occur during pregnancy b<It actuallY 
was simultaneous with his very 
conception. 
This type of complain t differed 
from previous actions in that the 
injury was not a physical injury but_ an 
injury of reputation and status in _life. 
Thus, not being concrete or tangt~le, 
there would be difficulty in assessing 
damages or in arranging compensation, 
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for which there should be 
Important for our consideration are 
remarks of the Court with 
IIICI:en,~e to the right to life of a fetus: 
case at bar seems to be the natural 
of the present course of the law 
,_.lttilt~ actions · for physical injury ever 
to the moment of conception. In 
of time it goes just a little further. The 
111De&n1re of this course to us is this: if 
to be permitted an infant injured 
after conception, why not if 
one week after, one minute after or 
moment of conception? It is 
that the date will be further 
- pessed. How can the law distinguish 
day development of life? If there 
life, proved by the subsequent 
then that human life has the same 
llt the time of conception as it has at 
thereafter. (emphasis supplied) 
be absolutes in the minute to 
progress of life from sperm and 
c_ell, to embryo to fetus, to 
excerpt clearly indicates that as 
as life and the right to life is 
, there is · no logical or 
basis for any distinction 
as viability or non-viability. The 
Which is conceived with the 
of the sperm and the ovum to 
the zygote is the same life which 
is growing through each of the stages 
of pregnancy and it is the same life 
which is ultimately born and which 
develops into the infant, the child, the 
adolescence and the mature adult. 
The second case was brought 
initially before the New York State 
Court of Claims in 1965. The action 
was brought on behalf of a female 
child, born in December, 1962, by her 
grandfather. He alleged that his 
daughter - the mother of the child -, 
an unmarried girl, while a patient at 
Manhattan State Hospital in New York 
City, was raped by another inmate and 
as a result, she became pregnant and 
the child was born illegitimate . The 
suit further alleges that the rape 
occurred because of improper 
supervision, thus making the hospital 
and the State liable , and that the 
grandfather requested state authorities 
to perform an abortion and their 
refusal brought about the illegitimate 
birth, for which injury compensation 
is sought from the State of New York. 
The decision by the Court of Claims 
was rendered by Justice Sidney Squire 
on June 25, 1965. He concluded that 
such an action could be brqught and 
there could be recovery for damages 
sustained by having been born with 
the social stigma of illegitimacy if it 
could be- legally established that the 
pregnancy resulted from a rape which 
occurred because of improper 
supervision of the patients by the 
hospital. The decision noted that nipe 
would be a "foreseeable" result by the 
hospital authorities of improper 
supervision. 
Judge Squire indicated that he did 
not approve the classification of the 
case as "a cause of action for wrongful 
life" and stated . that any expectation 
of subsequent actions for birth with 
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congenital defects would be 
"unrealistic, illogical and 
unsupportable" and without relation 
to the findings in the present case.2 2 
The attorney for the child, Norman 
Roy Grutman, contended that the 
action was for an "injury" of not 
having been put to death by abortio_n. 
The New York Times quotes him as 
saying that "it was this failure to abort 
and · therefore to mitigate damages that 
lies at the heart of the case."2 3 
Kindregan notes that "the advocates 
of Eugenic Abortion felt that this case 
introduced the idea of 'wrongful birth' 
into Anglo-American law - a theory 
which would require the law to permit 
'abortion whenever the child would 
enter -the world under adverse 
circumstances, e.g., as a mental or 
physical defective' ."2 4 
The decision of Justice Squire was 
reversed by the Appellate Division of 
the State· Supreme Court, which held 
that there "is no reasonable basis, 
consistent with public policy, for 
recognition of a cause of action 
predicated, first, upon a supposed 
objection on the part of the State to a 
person to be conceived and, second, 
upon allegations of damages not 
susceptible of ascertainment."2 5 The 
Appellate Judge reasoned that it 
would be impossible to compute the 
damages because such computation of 
compensation would . involve a 
comparison of injury against the "void 
of non-existence" .2 6 
As stated above, the third case 
concerns a child who was born with 
physical defects. The facts of the case 
are simple: Sandra Gleitman was 
examined by Doctor Robert Cosgrove, 
Jr. on April 20, 1959. At that time, 
the doctor found her two months 
pregnant. She informed the doctor 
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that , about March 20, 1959 , i1e had 
had an illness, which hr ; been 
diagnosed as German Measle2 During 
the next three months, the pa· mt was 
seen by a doctor at Fort ~ordon, 
Georgia, . where her husb; . d was 
stationed. In July of 1959, ·.he was 
seen by Doctor Jerome D ian, an 
associate of Doctor Cosgr· ,··e, and 
made monthly visits until ·he was 
delivered of a male child at Aargaret 
Hague Maternity Center, Jersey 
City, on November 25, 19 ~) . A few 
weeks after birth, it becam(' •.pparent 
that the child, Jeffrey, had :efc!cts in 
vision, hearing and speech. l :: has had 
several operations which J ve given 
him some visual capacity r.. .. .f he has 
attended a special c, ;rectional 
institute ·for children with .. ·sion and 
hearing defects. His condiL ·n, which 
is described by the court a:. 'seriously 
impaired" is not in cor L )ltion or 
dispute in the case? 7 
There were three seJ.. · •ate and 
distinct suits entered: the t.·st was an 
action on behalf of Jeffrey S leitman, 
the infant, for his birth c 'fects; the 
second was a suit by Sandr·.· ~Ieitman, 
the mother for the effc . :s on her 
emotional state caused b~.· her son's 
condition; and the third w<::~ all action 
entered by Irwin Gleitman ~:he father, 
for recovery of damages fiased upo~ 
the costs incurred in the c2ring of his 
son. 
The trial court dismiss::d, without 
sending to the jury, the pe Uti on of the 
child, when the evidence". bearing 0~ 
his complaint, had beeG completed 
and the actions of the mother an 
father when all the evidence had been 
.. n 
presented. The Appellate DiVIS10 ' 
without entertaining : argument and t~ 
its own motion sent the case to 
' f NeW Supreme Court in the State o 
Jersey. 
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. Supreme Court on March 6 
aflrrmed the dismissal of th~ 
by the trial court. Four of 
seven judges voted for the 
and the remaining three 
for reversal.. There were four 
rendered: a majority opinion 
the four justices; a concurring 
by one of the four justices; a 
IISeJntilt~ opinion, which was signed 
two of the justices and a partially 
JlleJntir" 1~ opinion by the Chief 
. Thus, only two of the seven 
were in complete disagreement 
the majority view. 
Gleitman, in her petition, 
that Doctor Cosgrove, when 
about the attack of German 
assured her that this would 
no effect at all on her child. 
Cosgrove, in his testimony, 
this allegation and stated that, 
presence of another doctor and 
patient's mother, he had advised 
that there was a twenty per cent 
that the child could be born 
a defect. He added that, while 
doctors might recommend an 
he would not because he did 
consider it wise to destroy four 
babies merely because the 
might be born with a defect. 
Dolan stated that the 
had never questioned him 
the effects of German measles 
child and he did not discuss the 
with her. In addition, he 
out that when he saw her, she 
In her fifth month of pregnancy 
a medically safe abortion could 
performed at that time. 
theory of plaintiffs suit is 
negligently failed to 
Mrs. Gleitman, their patient, of 
which German measles 
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might have upon the infant then in 
gestation. Had the mother been so 
informed, plairltiffs assert, she might . 
have obtained other medical advice 
with the view to the obtaining of an 
abortion. Plaintiffs do not assert that 
Mrs. Gleitman's life or health was in 
jeopardy during the term of . her 
pregnancy ."2 8 
The trial court, as previously noted 
... ·, 
• ' ~ ' • • • I 
. ,,,, 
dismissed all complaints without 
submitting any of them to the jury: 
the complaint of the infant was 
dismissed because there was no 
evidence that the acts of the 
defendants were in any way the 
proximate cause of his condition; the 
actions of the parents were dismissed 
because the trial judge believed the 
suggested abortion would be criminal 
in accordance with the statutes of New 
Jersey. 
. .. "' ·.' ~ '. : :. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey 
in the instant case,' referred to th~ 
right of an infant in New Jersey to sue 
for prenatal injuries as set forth in a 
previous decision of the same Tribunal 
(Smith v. Brennan, 31 N. J. 353, 157 
A 2d 497 (1960) ) and quoted from 
this decision: 
"The semantic argument whether an unborn 
child is •a person in being' seems to us to be 
beside the point. · There is no question that 
conception sets in motion bioiogical 
processes which if undisturbed will produce 
what everyone will concede to be a person 
in being. " 2 9 , 
The majority opinion continues: 
..The infant plaintiff is therefore required to 
say not that he should have been born 
without defects but that he should not have 
been born at all ... he claims that the 
conduct of defendants prevented his mother 
from obtaining an abortion which would 
have tenninated his existence, and that his 
very life is •wrongful'."30 
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With reference to compensatory 
damages, the court stated: 
"Damages are · measured by comparing the 
condition plaintiff would have been in, had 
the defendants not been negligent, With the 
plaintiff's impaired condition as a result of 
the negligence. The infant plaintiff would 
have us measure the difference between life 
with defects against the utter void of 
nonexistence, but it is impossible to make 
such a determination. This court cannot 
weigh the value of life with impairments 
against the nonexistence of life itself. " 31 
As to the damages, sustained by the 
parents, Judge Proctor, writing the 
majority opinion, noted: 
"Denial of the claim for damages by adult 
plaintiffs is also required \>y a close look at 
exactly what it is they are here seeking. The 
thrust of their complaint is that they were 
denied the opportunity to terminate the life 
of their child while he was an 
embryo .. : substantial policy reasons 
prevent the court from allowing tort 
damages for the denial of the opportunity 
to take an ·embryonic life." 
"It is basic to the human condition to seek 
life and hold on to it . however heavily 
burdened. (emphasis supplied) If Jeffrey 
could have been asked as to whether his life 
should be snuffed out before his full term of 
gestation could run its course, our felt 
intuition of human nature tells us he would 
almost surely choose life with defects as 
against no life at all. " 3 2 
Referring to the right to life and to 
the worthwhileness of life, the 
majority opinion very forthrightly 
observed: 
"The right to life is inalienable in our 
society. A court cannot say what defects 
should prevent an embryo from being 
allowed life such that the denial of the 
opportunity to terminate the existence of a 
defective child in embryo can support a 
cause for action. Examples of famous 
persons who have had great achievement 
despite physical defects come readily to 
mind, and many of us can think of examples 
close to home. A child need not be perfect 
to have a worthwhile life." 
272 
"We are not faced here with the ne . 
balancing the mother's life again~ 
her child. The sanctity of the sing· human 
life is the . decisive factor in this su in tort. 
Eugenic considerations are not co . trolling. 
We are not talking here about the )reeding 
of prize cattle. It may have been . · 1sier for 
the mother and less expensive for ' ·re father 
to have terminated the life of t ~ir child 
while he was an · embryo, but th r • ,, alleged 
detriments cannot stand ag,. ·zst the 
preciousness of ·the single hum ,· · life to 
support a remedy in tor.t."3 3 .;mphasis 
supplied) 
The court concluded its de ;sian by 
remarking: 
"Though we sympathize .·ith the 
unfortunate situation in which tl t· .0 parents 
fmd themselves, we firmly belie'. . the right 
of their child to live is greatc' ;·han and 
precludes their right not endure 
emotional and financial . injury . and even 
if such alleged damages were C( . ·rizable, a 
claim for th~m would be preclu· ·ed by the 
counterwaiting public policy suv <,rting the 
preciousness of human life. " 34 
While Justice Francis· ac .;pted the 
arguments and the con elm:. ms of the 
majority opmwn, he p· .: pared a 
lengthy concurring opinim. in which 
he presented additional co1 ::.iderations 
and observations, whkn further 
confirmed and establishfd , in his 
opinion, the majority find(ng that the 
actions, presented by th ~; plaintiffs, 
were not cognizable in 1 he law and 
should be dismissed. 
In general, Justice Fran ;~; s relied on 
the position that abortion i · illegal and 
criminal in the state of New Jersey and 
i~ most other states in every 
circumstance -save where the life of the 
mother is endangered by the 
continuation of the pregnancy.. Since 
this is so, the plaintiffs could not 
expect the doctors either to perforJJI 
the abortion or even recommend an 
abortion in the situation where the life 
and health of the mother were not 
involved and whe re onlY the 
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of the child being born 
was at issue. The conclusion 
therefore, clear: there was no 
ce on the part of . the 
t doctors; there was no injury 
father, mother or child; there 
ne ~ction that was cognizable by 
law. 
The concurring opinion provides an 
llent history of abortion 
and its purpose in New 
. The statute was passed in 1849 
result of a quashing of an 
nt for abortion by the 
Court in that same year. The 
for the quashing was the 
ClUirei1ner1t in common law that the 
of abortion existed only in the 
of the life of a "quick" child 
in the instant case, (State v. 
22 N.J.L. 52) quickening had 
as yet occurred when the 
~tancv was te.rrninated. 
was felt that the common law 
be modified by a statutory 
and this gave birth to the 
statute which forbade abortion 
stage of a pregnancy "without 
justification." This legislation 
the mother, the child and 
morality in a way which the 
law could not. 
a footnote, Justice Francis 
from a dicision of the Supreme 
of l(entucky in an identical case 
v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 
to demonstrate the necessity of 
to correct the inadequacy 
common law: 
interest of good morals ~d for the 
of society, the law should 
&OCirtil[}n~ and miscarriages, willfully 
at any time during the period of 
That the child shall be considered 
nee from the moment of 
-- - - -- -- ----------------
coneeption for the protection of its . rights 
of property, and yet not in existence until 
fo'!r or five months after the inception of its 
bemg, to the extent that it is a crime to 
destroy it, presents an anomaly in the law 
that ought to be provided against by the 
law-making department of the 
government. ,:rs 
~ith reference to the 1849 statute, 
wh1ch was not substantially changed in 
the revisions of 1872, 1898, or 1952, 
Justice Francis remarks: 
"The lawmakers were saying as a matter of 
public policy that the moment the womb 
becomes. instinct with embryonic life, it 
should be unlawful to interrupt the ordinary 
development of the life 'without lawful 
~ustiftcation.' In my judgment, the more 
unportant consequence of the statute is the 
~egislative recognition and sequential 
mcorporatio~ in the . law of the principle 
that th~ child as a legal entity begins at 
co~cept10n, as of that time it has a legal 
existence as a separate entity as 
distinguished from a mere part of its 
mot~er's body. Distinctions based upon 
p_hysiCal status during gestation such as 
embryo, fetus and viability lost their earlier 
impact on the crime of abortion. It was not 
until relatively recent years · that the 
judiciary became aware of the fact of the 
· ~tent of the legislation."36 
· Referring to the argument that the 
original statute of 1849 made 
provisions for the health as well as for 
th~ ~ife of the mother, the concurring 
opmwn remarked: 
"There is nothing in the legislative language 
to support that idea. It seems to me there 
:-vere two objectives, of about equal 
tmport~ce. One was to provide greater 
protectiOn for the child in utero than was 
given under the common law. , To 
accomplish this, the safeguard against 
abortion was moved backward from the 
time when the child became quick, to the 
moment of conception. Important sequelae 
have flowed directly or indirectly from this 
change . . . The unborn child exists as a 
legal entity from the moment of 
conception. The second objective was to 
furnish additional protection for the life and 
h~al~ of. t~e. mother by establishing the 
cnrmnal liability for the abortionist as of 
the beginning of the pregnancy. " 3 7 
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Justice · Francis concluded that the 
abortion in this particular case could 
hardly be called therapeutic and must 
be considered eugenic: 
"A termination of pregnancy of the type 
mentioned in this case is described properly 
in ·the. Chief Justice's dissent as a eugenic 
abortion. Eugenics is the science which 
commits itself to improving the stock, 
whether human or animal; to means and 
methods of improving the · physical and 
mental qualities of future generations, to 
control of mating and reproduction. In the 
context of a case like the present one, a 
eugenic abortion would be one based on the 
probability or possibility that the fetus may 
be born as a mentally or physically · 
abnormal person. No American statute 
authorizes such an abortion. " 3 8 . . 
Commenting on eugenic abortion, 
the concurring opinion noted: 
"Yet the eugenic abortion advocates would 
destroy every fetus when associated with an 
early pregnancy rubella. . .. there are 
doctors who feel that abortion in rubella 
cases represents a negative approach. They 
hold the ·view that their profession is 
devoted to the preservation of life, not to its 
destruction; that the major efforts in this 
field should be based on research and 
pointed toward prevention, not 
destruction. " 3 9 
Justice Francis concludes his 
concurring sentence: 
"Under all the circumstances of this case, in 
my judgment it would have been a crime for 
Doctor Cosgrove or Dolan or any other New 
Jersey physician to abort the normal 
pregnancy of Mrs. Gleitman because she had 
had rubella in the first trimester of her 
pregnancy. Consequently, the defendants 
did not violate any legal duty which would 
make them liable in damages to her or her 
husband or their child, even if they failed to 
advise her of the possibility that her child 
might be defective, and that there were 
places where she could have an abortion 
performed, if she elected to do so." 
"Furthermore, as I suggested above, no such 
abortion has ever been sanctioned as lawful 
in any other state. The contrary appears to 
be the case, and even more strongly so than 
in New Jersey, because in all but a minimal 
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number of states, by express · atutory 
provision, preservation of the liJ. of the 
mother is made the only cause for ; \Jortion. 
But, even if there were some state v. foreign 
country where an abortion for rut Ua were 
lawful in the face of the presei ~ strong 
public' policy of New Jersey again:· such an 
abortion, no cause of action for 'i amages 
should be recognized in New J, ·1ey if a 
local physician did not advise 11 . patient 
that some such form existed."40 
Chief Justice Weintraub ·Hrote a 
partly dissenting opmwn m the 
Gleitman v. Cosgrove and Dl ')n case. 
He· ~greed in part with the m. ~ ority in 
that the complaint of the ,_ J.ld was 
not cognizable in law but h: felt that 
the parents did sustain a wr, qg or an 
injury and, while he conce(1 J that it 
would be difficult to ev":, ~ate the 
damage in a compensatory · :·)hi on, he 
felt that a jury · unde; judicial 
supervision could arrive at ar ::quitable 
settlement. · 
In his opinion, he m Je some 
interesting observations: 
"Contraception and abortion i· .J.ve this in 
common that whereas in rn c<. t areas of 
criminal' prohibition the fac. of e~ is 
evident to most people, here tr ..;re is evil or 
none at all depending whc;1y upon .a 
spiritual supposition, for while ·nen agre~tt 
is wrong to take life, yet kno ,,.i ng nothiJig 
about the void before or after iheir earthlY 
presence they cannot agree up·"n the point 
at which a living thing should h~ thou~ht _to 
be human in its being. We kno\,' there ts ~e 
in the ovum and sperm befOI\, concep~on 
but as to the morality of contraception, 
every argument starts from and returns to 
an ethical or religious assumption. Hence he 
who opposes and he w;w supports 
contraception is equally sure he respects the 
dignity of man: And so as to abortio~, m: 
cannot agree upon the stage at wh~ch Jiti 
embryo or fetus has a claim to acquue e 
·de a in human form strong enough to ove~ 
woman's right to her own 
integrity. " 41 
The Chief Justice in this quotation, 
, ake 
errs by attempting to m. 
contraception, which is the preventto~ 
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, analogous to abortion, which is 
takiilg of life. Also, he indicates 
man may find it difficult to 
11termir1e when human life begins to 
but embryology very clearly 
that it begins at conception. He 
encounter. a difficulty in 
when this human life 
a right to be born but the 
jurisprudence unhesitatingly 
that this rigpt is acquired at 
is inconceivable that the granting 
respecting of a fetus' right to live 
be born can in any way violate the 
s right to bodily integrity. 
respect to the claim advanced on 
of the infant, l agree with the 
that it cannot be maintained. 
the infant's complaint is that he 
be better off not to have been born. 
who knows nothing of death or 
~·&""il>il>, cann~t possibly know whether 
must remember that the choice is not 
being born with health or being 
t it; it is not claimed the 
failed to do something to 
or reduce the ravages of rubella. 
the choice is between a worldly 
and none at all. Implicit, beyond 
against a physician for faulty 
is the proposition that a pregnant 
who, duly informed, does not seek 
· and all who urge her to see the 
through, are guilty of wrongful 
to the fetus, and indeed that every 
which the infant is sustained after 
a ~Y of wrong. To recognize a right 
born is to enter an area in which 
could fmd his way."42 
in other respects the mother is hurt in 
right by the denial to her of her 
accept or reject a parental · 
with the child. The father, too, 
right is wholly dependent upon 
decision, is so directly 
her decision that he may fairly 
as a victim of a wrong done to 
'1968 
One is tempted to inquire if it is not 
a complete inversion of order and 
values to hold that a woman, who· 
voluntarily consented to a sexual 
relationship with her husband, which 
gives rise to the pregnancy, has the 
right to reject her relationship to the 
child thus conceived when this 
rejection deprives him of his basic, 
fundamental and ·inalienable right to 
live and to be born. Can anyone's right 
ever be considered totally and entirely 
by itself to the complete exclusion of 
a consideration of how the rights of 
others might be violated or denied 
when said person seeks the honoring 
of his own personal right? 
Since when and by what reasoning 
did a husband's right over his offspring 
become so dependent on his wife's 
rights and decisions to the extent that 
he can be denied the right to . a child 
merely because his wife, seeking her 
own pleasure and convenience, has 
decided to terminate a pregnancy? Has 
the husband made no contribution to 
the formation of the fetus? 
"It would be difficult to strike a net balance 
between the intangible pluses IDld minuses 
in a parent-child relationship, and it would 
be the rare case in which a parent would 
testify that it is his or her present wish that 
the child had not been born. No one who 
has witnessed the love of a parent for an 
imbecile could expect so crass a 
computation from the parent's lips. But I 
believe that even without such testirilony an 
outsider could evaluate the injury, and I 
would recognize a right in the parents to 
seek that evaluation, subject to car~ful 
judicial supervision, in order to support the 
woman's right to choose whether to risk this 
misfortune."44 
From these three cases, it is cleai 
that the courts do not recongize any 
action of "wrongful life" and do not 
believe that a fetus has a right "not to 
be born" when the alternative might 
be birth with social stigma or birth 
with physical defects. 
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8. The Personality Status of Fetal 
Life in State Constitutions 
At this juncture, it is important and 
useful to inquire what status an 
unborn child enjoys under State 
Constitutions. Is a fetus considered for 
legal purposes to be a person? 
Kindregan presents a norm and 
criterion whereby this que~tion 'can be 
answered. He suggests that 1if the fetus 
is endowed with rights that are 
customarily granted only to persons, 
then the fetus is judged to be a person. 
"The lawyer can reasonably believe that a 
fetus is a person because the law has 
consistently invested fetal life with civil 
rights in every area of litigation in which the 
questi9n has arisen. . .. Every indication 
points toward the conclusion that a fetus is 
a person under constitutional law because 
our legal process has consistently treated 
him as a person vested with civil rights."45 
Kindregan points to the decisions of 
two State Supreme Courts - Oregon 
and Ohio - to demonstrate that the 
Constitutions of these States clearly 
identify a fetus as a person. In the 
Mallison v. Pomeroy (205 Or. 690, 
291 P. 2d 225 (1955)) case, a suit was 
brought to recover for injuries that 
had been sustained by a six month 
fetus. The Constitution of Oregon 
"assured a remedy by due course of 
law to every ' person for injury done to 
him in his person. The Supreme Court 
of Oregon noted that the . State had 
recognized 'the separate entity of an 
unborn child by protecting him in his 
property rights and agajnst criminal 
conduct,' and concluded that an 
unborn child is a person within the 
meaning of the state constitution."4 6 
The Williams v. Marion Rapid 
Transit case (152 Ohio St. 114, 87 
N.E. 2d 334 (1949) ) was decided 
under a provision of the Ohio 
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Constitution which provides tl .t "all 
courts shall be open, and every : erson, 
for an injury done him in lu land, 
goods, person or reputation sh.- .1 have 
a remedy by due course of 1 w and 
shall have justice administerr i him 
without denial or delay." (Ohio 
Constitution, Sec. 16, art. 1) 
This action was brought in suit to_ 
recover for prenatal · injur• ·s that 
resulted from an accident i which 
there was alleged negligent c -eration 
of a bus. The Supreme Cou: of the 
State of Ohio made a finding .hat the 
fetus was a person within the 
and interpretation 
above-mentioned section of 'le state 
Constitution: 
"to hold that the plaintiff in the : ;tant case 
did not suffer an injury in her pe: . · n would 
require this court to announct Jiat as a 
matter of law the infant is a . :rt of the 
mother until birth and has n separate 
existence in law until that time. . " our view 
such a ruling would deprive the ir ant of the 
right conferred by the Constit1 ion of aD 
persons, by the application of < ;.ime-~o~ 
fiction not founded on fact " 1d Within 
common knowledge U l' .::ue and 
unjustified. " 4 7 
SUMMARY 
We have considered the fetus and 
the unborn child with n : erence to 
many and varied rights wh j_ch he has 
been accorded by constit t:~.ional and 
statutory law and by juri·;prudential 
judgement: the right of the fetus .to 
sue for prenatal injuries, to rece1ve 
support, to .inherit, to re(.,over under 
Workmen's Compensation Act, to sue 
before birth through a legallY 
appointed guardian. Further, we have 
demonstrated that the law does not 
recognize an action of wrongful life or 
the right of a fetus not to be b~rnt 
Finally, we have established th~ r~~ 
of a· fetus to be free from criJnlll 
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. and t~ be protected from the P-P=--1 with, diminished · or extinguished 
. actiOnS . of ~th~rs, . which without due process 6f law. If this be 
mterfere wtth h1s nght to be true, then it would seem that the 
and his basic right to life; suggested statutes to liberalize present 
1 a w recognizes, as does 
.,._.,,..
11
""n"', that human life exists 
the moment of conception, that 
fetus is a distinct and separate 
from the mother, although 
t upon her for circulatory 
nutritional ·needs, and that this 
life is found and vested in a 
who has rights - not the least 
is the right . to live and to be 
COROLLARY 
the fetus has human life from the 
moment of conception and is a 
person, does it have the 
guarantee of equal 
with ·a born child against 
deprived of that life without due 
of law? If, in fact, it does have 
have this protection, would 
proposed legislative statutes to 
existing abortion laws be in 
of equal protection and due 
would appear only logical and 
to expect that law will not 
within itself contradictory 
or incompatible holdings. If 
human life in general is protected 
Federal and State Constitutions 
this life cannot be violated, 
away or extinguished without 
of law, then it would seem 
that this same protettion 
~anteed to unborn, fetal life, 
recognized by law and 
llll«llen,~e to be human life from 
moment of conception and to 
in a human person, and that 
life cannot be tampered 
'1968 
abortion laws would violate the 
fourteenth amendment guarantee of 
equal protection unless it is proved 
that the provisions of these statutes do 
not discriminate against unborn life, as 
compared to born life, and that the 
proposed preca,utions do in fact 
constitute due process of law.-
Kindregan, a professor of law at 
Suffolk University Law School, states: 
" ... repeal of all abortion prohibitions 
would not be compatible with 
con temporary understanding of the 
equal-protection clause of the U. S. 
Constitution. Equal protection is becoming 
ever more a positive concept; in this our 
constitutional law is reaching toward a ~ore 
civilized standard of jurisprudence. Can a 
State simply refuse to provide equal 
protection for the lives of persons within its 
jurisdiction because they have not passed 
through the stage of birth? To do so would 
violate the positive duty of the State to 
insure the lives of all persons against 
arbitrary treatment. Are we prepared to say 
that ~e State is maintaining equal 
prot~ction of law when it allows one person 
to kill another because he is defective or is 
just ??t 'want~d'? The Anglo-American legal 
tradition conSistently recognizes the human 
person as coming into existence at· 
conception (in property, tort and 
constitutional law, as well as in criminal 
law); are the States to now confer licenses 
Qf discrimination against persons in 
utero?"48 
Byrn, a professor of law at Ford4am 
· University, maintains: 
" ... the child, if he is a separate human 
entity, is entitled to the protection of the 
law. The Fourteenth Amendment, of 
course, forbids state action which deprives a 
person of the equal protection of the 
law ..... It is for the proponents of 
abortion to bear the burden of proving that 
this separate human life (the unborn child) 
is not a personal life to be protected by the 
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· Fourteenth Amendment. It is interesting 
that Professor Bernard Schwartz, in 
speaking about the unconstitutionality of 
discriminatory legislation directed against 
Negroes, has -said that since .we have no 
scientific evidence to show that the negro is 
inferior, we may not discriminate against 
him without running afoul of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Apparently we 
cannot, with any scientific validity establish 
a different and inferior quality of life in the 
unborn child; therefore the same principle 
should apply and we should be abie to say 
to the persons who urge abortion, 'you have 
not born~ your burden of proving that this 
life is inferior and that. it may be treated in 
an unequal and discriminatory manner by 
deprivi~ it of the equal protection of the 
law'." 4 
The same writer proclaims: 
"There is · no qualitative difference, 
scientifically speaking, between human life 
in the womb and human life after birth. 
Hence, legislation, which would remove the 
life of a person in the womb from the full 
and equal protection of the law, would be as 
discriminatory, as irrational, and as inimical 
to the equal protection clause as the 
legislative classification of races."50 
(emphasis_ supplied) 
Louisell, Professor of Law at 
University of California, Berkeley, in a 
paper entitled, Abortion, the Practice 
of Medicine and the Due Process of 
Law, sets forth the following 
observations: 
"The justification of the abortion (under 
the recommendations of the American Law 
Institute) would therefore involve no 
judicial process and no representation of the 
public interest or that of the husband or 
unborn child. In fact justification is 
complete upon the request of the pregnant 
woman and certification of two physicians 
without involvement of or even information 
to any other agency or person, except that 
the hospital and, in the case of abortion 
based on felonious intercourse the 
prosecuting attorney or the police, must be 
notified. Does this easy path to destruction 
of the fetus potentially conflict with our 
ethic of reverence for human life, and the 
legal norm crystallized in the constituional 
mandate of due process of law? The 
question should be considered in the 
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context of the · law's historic l:! _titude 
respecting the fetus as a 
person. . . . The progress of the <lW in 
recognition of the fetus as a human ;>erson 
for all purposes has been strong and steady 
and roughly proportional to the gr· wth of 
knowledge of biology and embryok .:;y. The 
current abortion proposals cons1 tute a 
threat to this progress .. . i e law 
proceeding apace to recognize in ··.is area 
(tort actions), as it historically has n other 
areas, that the . unborn child is . human 
person .. . . The basic legal right of the 
unborn child · are therefore as ecurely 
rooted generally as those ( · other 
persons. . .. But the law forfeits he legal 
right to life only for grave reason end after 
due process. The proposed legisfa <On may 
forfeit life for reasons potentially • Jt grave 
in relation to the seriousnes·· of the 
forfeiture itself, and wholly wH ut any 
process of law - unless the opini· 1 of two 
physicians can be considered as s1. h. . . . It 
would be strange for the law, soch ,,y 's organ 
for deciding matters of life and leath, to 
delegate to two physicians - om f whom 
may have self-interest as the -~ spective 
fee-earning surgeon - the exclusb function 
of deciding who shall live and c -·~ . Such a 
function invokes the due process . f law, not 
the ipse dixit of two physicians. . .. If the 
child's right to life is to be ,.,dghed for 
example against a parent's desi~ -~ to avoid 
the prospect of a gravely defecti'- child, the 
ethos of our law would seem to ,.:,quire that 
the scales be judicial ones, wh ;:;h should 
register decision only after dut process of 
law .... The medical professio, , should be 
wary of a statute that wm1 d formallY 
ordain the legal right of any t ~ 1 physicians 
to justify an abortion under ~;:e nebulous 
standards proposed. In prh,ciple, that 
profession should be reluctant to exchange 
its historic role of champion in th e struggle 
for life for the role c•f even a 
well-inte'ntioned judge-e :- ccutioner. 
Moreover, physicians as much :t~ manY men 
stand in need of the due proce~;s of law, an~ 
should realize · that the rights !.>f anY of us 
are sec~\e only while . thost; of all are 
secure." 
CONCLUSION 
It is inconceivable that a law that 
recogm·zes fetal life as human life frotll 
tifl the very moment of concep 0 ' 
accepts the fetus as a human person, 
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with many legal rights - not 
of which is the right · to be 
·and to be allowed to grow and 
without interference - , a law 
assumes a responsibility to grant 
born life that equal protection 
due process of law' which is 
d to all life and is made 
to born life, . it is 
IHloeiva:ble that such law would 
ate or dare, by statutory 
, to allow the arbitrary taking 
extinguishing of unborn life 
to preserve the health, personal 
or convenience of the 
to avoid the birth of retarded 
defective children or to 
remedy for felonious 
Private 
• Jromio.Penal Code, 270. 
v. Sianes, 134 Cal. App. 355, 25 
487' 488 (1933). 
Is Legalized Abortion the 
to Criminal Abortion? 37 
of Colorado Law Review, 
'· Hancock, 32 Mass. 255 (1834). 
Re Wells' Will, . l29 Misc. Rep. 447, 
N.Y. Supp. at 725 (1927). 
v. Susino Construction Com-
130 N.J.L. 418, 33 A. 2d 607 
Ct., 1943). 
'· Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100 
806 (1940). 
, 1968 
l2)Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super 517, 
171 A 2d 140 (1961). 
13) Raleigh Fitkin - Paul Morgan Memorial 
Hospital v. Anderson , 42 N.J. 421, 201 
A. 2d 537 (1964). 
14) Barry, The Child En Ventre Sa Mere, 
the Australian Law Journal, Vol. 14, p. 
351, footnote n. 5. · 
15) Ibidem, pp. 351, 352. 
16) 22 N.J.L. 52, 51 Am. Dec. 77 (1949). 
17) 67 N.J. Super, 517, 171 A. 2d 140 
(1961). 
18) In Re The Application of the President 
and Directors of Georgetown College, 
Inc. 331 F. 2d 1010 (Washington, D.C., 
1964). 
19) Raleigh Fitkin - Paul Morgan Memorial 
Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 
A. 2d 537 (1964). 
20) 377 u.s. 985 (1964). 
21) Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 
190 N.E. 2d 849 (1963). 
22) Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 
. N.Y.S. 2d 953 (1965). -
23)America, July 10, 1965. 
24) loc. cit., p. 62. 
25) Williams v. State, 25 App. Div. 2d 906, 
269 N.Y.S. 2d 786. 
26)Ibidem. 
27) Gleitman v. Cosgrove and Dolan, 49 
N.J. 22, 227 A. 2d 689 (1967) at 690. 
28) loc. cit. at 691. 
29) loc. cit. at 692. 
30)Ibidem. 
3l)Ibidem. 
32) loc. cit. at 693. 
33)Ibidem. 
279 
• , , I 
I~ o 0 I 1 • f 
' ,; .' -· · · : . " ~ I' ' t 
' I ~. • •i ~ I ;' I I ' • 
': .,_ \I 
, .. 
: ~ 'I ,', 
_' 1 
34)/bidem. 
35) Zoe. cit. at 694, 695. 
36) Zoe. cit. at 696. 
37) Zoe. cit. at 699. 
38) Zoe. cit. at 701. 
39) Zoe. cit. at 702. 
40) Zoe. cit. at 703. 
41) Zoe. cit. at 709. 
42) Zoe. cit. at 71 i. 
43) Zoe. cit. at 712. 
44)/bidem. 
280 
45) Abortion and the 
Manuscript, p. 67. 
46) Zoe. cit., pp. 67, 68. 
47)/bidem 
· 48) Letter to the Editor, America 
21, 1967. 
49) Legal Perspectives of Abort! 
presented at the National J. 
Diocesan . Attorneys . at ~ 
D.C., April, 1967. 
50) Bym, Abortion in Persr :tive, 5 
Duquesne University Law J· ~view, ~ 
134-135. 
51) Paper prepared for the II mational 
Symp9sium on Abortion held · 
Washington, D.C., Septernbe; <967. 
Linacre QuarterlY 
ergency Shipments to Nigeria 
thousand, seven hundred and 
pounds of medical supplies 
tly needed to relieve the 
of war refugees in Nigeria 
afra were shipped on 
y, July 17th, via ocean 
, by the Catholic Medical 
Board, 10 West 17th St., New 
City. _ 
shipment valued at $13,257.76 
is the latest in a series of 
consignments of medical 
forwarded by the Board to 
the victims of Nigeria's civil war. 
of infants' nutritional 
analgesic 
tablets, bandages, 
soap, and enrichment 
, a food supplement for 
ficient diets, and was due to 
in Nigeria about August 7th. 
on the high seas was a 
shipment which was expected 
in Apapa, on Nigeria's coast, 
19th. Valued at $87,653.95 
, · it also contains infants' 
onal products, vitamins, 
and dressings in addition to 
anti-tuberculosis, malarials, 
drugs .. These supplies 
be used in Nigeria's Northern, 
, Bonny, and Calabar 
including such towns as 
Nsukka, Ikom, Ogoja, Agbor, 
Patani, and those west of the 
'1968 
The Board ·made four special 
shipments of medical supplies earlier 
· this year to the area, via Lisbon - one 
in 1a~uaty, , two in February, and one 
in June, These supplies, valued at 
$88,905.91 wholesale, included 
medical and surgical instruments, 
hospital goods of all kinds, and 
disease-fighting products such as 
tetanus toxoid vaccine, antibiotics, 
sulfonamides, antidiarrheals, vitamins 
and iron prepara,tions. 
With its July 17th shipment, the 
Board has forwarded since the 
beginning of the year $406,817.62 
(wholesale value) worth of medical 
supplies to assist the civil war refugees. 
These shipments include six special 
consignments and the Board's general 
shipment requested by Catholic 
missionaries' hospitals, dispensaries, 
clinics, orphanages, schools, etc. The 
Board's general shipment, which 
arrived in Nigeria in mid-February, had 
a wholesale value of $217,000. 
Two of the .special shipments were 
requested by Catholic Relief Servi<;es 
in New York and in Lagos, the 
Nigerian capital, where CRS works 
with the Nigerian and International 
Red Cross to assist refugees displaced 
by the war. Distribution of the 
Catholic Medical Mission Board's 
general shipment, as well as its two 
special shipments, was under CRS 
supervision and . covered war-disaster 
areas. 
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